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Abstract: John Finnis since 1980 has published many 
important scholarly papers treating different aspects of 
religious liberty. These works include both philosophical 
and theological perspectives. Some of the best of this 
work has specifically addressed Dignitatis humanae (DH), 
the Second Vatican Council’s declaration of Religious 
Freedom. Perhaps surprisingly, then, Finnis says almost 
nothing explicitly about either the Council or about reli-
gious freedom in Natural Law and Natural Rights. I shall 
argue here that Finnis nonetheless identifies and co-
gently defends in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) 
the foundational components of a sound conception 
of religious liberty. Building upon these anchor points 
– drawing a line connecting the dots, if you will – one 
can bring this conception into clear view. Because it is 
constructed bottom up from deep philosophical founda-
tions, this implicit account of religious liberty is critically 
justified, as well as robust. In this article I also build upon 
Finnis’s foundations, and show how putative divine reve-
lations to humankind impact religious liberty and, then, 
describe the cultural formations conducive to making ro-
bust religious liberty practically available to the inquiring, 
deliberating, acting person.
Keywords: natural law; religion; religious liberty; Finnis; 
Dignitatis humanae.
Resumen: John Finnis ha publicado, desde 1980, muchos 
trabajos académicos importantes dedicados a diferen-
tes aspectos de la libertad religiosa. Entre las perspectivas 
utilizadas para tales aportaciones figuran la filosófica y la 
teológica. Algunos de sus mejores estudios se han referido, 
específicamente, a la declaración del Concilio Vaticano II 
sobre la libertad religiosa, Dignitatis humanae. Quizás por 
ello pueda sorprender que Finnis apenas se remita explíci-
tamente a la libertad religiosa o al Concilio en Natural Law 
and Natural Rights (NLNR). Pese a ello, argumentaré aquí 
que, Finnis, no obstante, identifica y defiende en dicha 
obra, y, convincentemente, los elementos fundacionales 
de una sólida concepción de libertad religiosa. Por así de-
cirlo, partiendo de, y enlazando, esos elementos , podre-
mos llegar a visualizar claramente, si nos lo proponemos, 
tal concepción. ste implícito planteamiento de libertad 
religiosa atesora solidez y rigor crítico por su configuración 
a partir de profundos fundamentos filosóficos. También 
me apoyo en los fundamentos de Finnis y muestro cómo 
las tenidas por revelaciones divinas a la humanidad, inci-
den en la libertad religiosa, para describir, a continuación, 
aquellas realidades culturales que contribuyen el robuste-
cimiento de una libertad religiosa practicable por aquellas 
personas que se cuestionan, deliberan y actúan.
Palabras clave: ley natural; religión; libertad religiosa; Fin-
nis; Dignitatis humanae.
intRoDuCtion
B etween the first and second editions of Natural Law and Natural Rights (hereinafter, NLNR), John Finnis published many philoso-phical essays on the subject of religious liberty. In addition to those 
collected in Religion and Public Reasons (which is volume V of his Collected 
Essays), several appeared during the first decade of this century, published 
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elsewhere 1. Finnis also brought out during those years some papers in which 
he explained and defended religious liberty from the viewpoint of Christian, 
and specifically Catholic, faith 2. These included substantial treatments of 
Dignitatis humanae, the Second Vatican Council’s «Declaration on Religious 
Freedom». All of these papers repay careful reading. Finnis explorations 
of the meaning and foundations of religious liberty are among this great 
scholar’s leading intellectual achievements.
There is just one reference to Dignitatis humanae in the 2011 «Post-
script» to NLNR. It does not engage religious liberty. It is rather an il-
lustration of Hohfedian rights analysis 3. This lone appearance corresponds 
to the scant reference to DH in the 1980 edition. Finnis there deployed 
it twice. One of them was (again) without specific reference to religious 
liberty. Finnis used DH’s account of «public order» as a good example of a 
term often used in international documents articulating human rights. 4 He 
mentioned DH later in NLNR as an illustration of how one could profitably 
understand a right of conscientious objection which was, in this context, 
not synonymous with religious liberty. He wrote that «when conscientious 
objection witnesses to basic values such as life or religion and is not radically 
incompatible with the genuine common good it may be tolerated notwith-
standing the conscientious judgment of the rulers that the law objected to 
is really necessary» 5. This endnote qualified textual passages in which Finn-
is considered «high-minded, conscientious opposition» to the demands of 
law: «[p]ractical reasonableness... demands that conscientious terrorism, for 
1 See, e.g., Finnis, J., Darwin, Dewey, Religion, and the Public Domain, reprinted in idem, Collected 
Essays, Religion and Public Reasons V, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; idem, «Why Reli-
gious Liberty is a Special, Important, and Limited Right», 2009; idem, «Equality and Religious 
Liberty», in Shah, Farr, Friedman (eds.), Religious Freedom and Gay Rights: Emerging Conflicts in 
the United States and Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. 
2 Perhaps the most insightful of these papers is Finnis’ reply to Thomas Pink, in J. Keown, R. 
George (eds.), Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2013. 
3 «The serviceability of Hohfeldian analysis for even moral rights is suggested by its...applica-
bility to the sophisticated and precise logical framework of the ‘right to religious liberty’ (as a 
claim-right not to be coerced in religious matters) expounded in Vatican II’s declaration on that 
matter». NLNR, op. cit., at p. 465. Finnis further opined in the «Postscript» that «the fact that 
the draftsmen described this right in non-Hohfeldian terminology as an immunity [rather than 
as a claim-right] does not affect the logic of their position»; idem, p. 465.
4 NLNR, op. cit., pp. 215–216.
5 Ibid., p. 291.
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example, be suppressed with as much conscientious vigor as other forms of 
criminality» 6.
These few passages tend to establish no more than a limited legal toler-
ation of conduct motivated by religious conviction, where the conduct would 
otherwise be contrary to the positive law. In NLNR does not, moreover, Finn-
is nowhere affirms any right of religious liberty. Nor does the «Postscript». 
There is no Index entry for «religious liberty» or «religious freedom» in ei-
ther edition. Neither engages, in any conspicuous way, with the subject at all.
I shall argue here that Finnis nonetheless identifies and cogently de-
fends the foundational components of a robust conception of religious liberty. 
Building upon these anchor points – drawing a line connecting the dots, if you 
will – one can bring this conception into clear view. Because it is constructed 
bottom up from deep philosophical foundations, this account of religious lib-
erty is critically justified, as well as robust.
Finnis made no effort in either edition of NLNR bring this picture into 
focus. The outline he laid down there nonetheless supplied the framework of 
his many explicit treatments of religious liberty in the interregnum between 
editions of NLNR.
In the first five parts of this essay, I shall excavate and expose what I call 
the «foundations» of religious liberty in NLNR. The sixth part amounts to a 
summation. In parts seven and eight I consider how putative divine revela-
tions to humankind impact religious liberty and, then, describe the cultural 
formations conducive to making robust religious liberty practically available 
to the inquiring, deliberating, acting person. These parts go well beyond con-
necting-the-dots of what Finnis says or implies in NLNR. These parts are 
nonetheless inspired by and consistent with NLNR.
i. natuRal Religion
The only significant «Postscript» development in the neighborhood of 
religious liberty involves what Finnis describes as the first edition’s «very aus-
tere, minimalist view of what can be affirmed on the basis of reason alone 
about the nature of God» 7. It was indeed «austere», and not mainly for a rea-
6 NLNR, op. cit., p. 261
7 Ibid., p. 424.
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son Finnis supplied in 1980: «Since this is not a book on natural theology or 
the philosophy of God, I may be excused for doing no more than referring the 
reader to at least one place [in fact, to Grisez’ Beyond the New Theism] where 
the objections I am aware of are fairly and sufficiently dealt with» 8. Finnis 
there had in mind some philosophical objections to an argument he advanced 
in NLNR to show that «D» (God) exists: «what the whole argument shows, 
with rational (not logical) necessity, is that if any state of affairs, that might 
not exist, exists, then D must exist; without it no state of affairs that might not 
exist could exist» 9.
Finnis’ catalog in the first edition of the truths of «natural theology» 
was short («austere») chiefly because that is what Finnis then believed. He 
wrote in 1980 that «nothing could be established philosophically about God 
beyond existence and causality» 10. In 2011 he wrote, that is «mistaken». His 
earlier cautions that further philosophical knowledge of God could only be 
«hypothetical and/or speculative» were, he wrote in the «Postscript», «un-
necessarily agnostic» 11.
The amending passages in the «Postscript» are several 12. In 2011 Finnis 
maintained that one could reasonably affirm that, so long as one predicates 
8 NLNR, op. cit., p. 387.
9 Ibid., p. 387
10 As recounted in 2011.
11 NLNR, op. cit., p. 479.
12 The fullest statement of the revision:
 The argument that we are, not logically, but rationally required to affirm the existence of a 
transcendent explanation/cause ‘which exists simply by being what it is, and which is required 
for the existing of any other state of affairs’ is said on p. 389 to be unable, ‘I think’, to take us 
further. That God’s nature is personal, that ‘the uncaused cause of all the good things of this 
world, including our ability to understand them) is itself a good that one could love, personal in 
a way that one might imitate, a guide that one might follow, or a guarantor of anyone’s practical 
reasonableness’ is said on p. 398 to be a set of propositions of which ‘it is impossible to have 
sufficient assurance... without some revelation more revealing than any that Plato or Aristotle 
may have experienced’. Hence the negative conclusion stated bluntly on p. 405: ‘... what can be 
established, by argumentation from the existence and general features of the world, concerning 
the uncaused cause of the world, does not directly assist us in answering’ the practical questions 
set up in the chapter’s first pages--about the possibility of a deeper explanation of obligation, 
the reasonableness of self-sacrifice in human friendship, ‘the point of living according to the 
requirements of practical reasonableness’, that is, ‘whether any further sense can be made of 
the whole situation... This limitation of natural reasoning’, I added, though it ‘leaves somehow 
«subjective» and «questionable» the whole structure of basic principles and requirements of 
practical reasonableness and human flourishing... does not unravel that structure or affect its 
internal order or weaken its claim to be more reasonable than any logically possible alternative 
structures’. Finnis, J., Philosophy and God’s Nature: Second Thoughts, in Collected... (op. cit.), V.
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human qualities analogously of God, God is like a person who makes intelli-
gent, free choices. An obvious implication of these affirmations is monotheism, 
that God is of one mind and acts with an undivided will. Finnis also affirmed 
in 2011 that guided by reason alone, one could affirm that God causes and 
sustains in existence all that there is (and was, and will ever be), according to 
some unfathomable (to us) divine creative plan. On this basis, it would seem 
prudent to affirm (though Finnis does not quite do so) what Christians call 
«Providence»: the God who created and sustains the entire cosmos cares for 
humankind and its good.
As we shall see in the next part, Finnis maintains in NLNR that the basic 
human good of religion consists fundamentally in trying to establish harmony 
between oneself and the divine entity. With the fuller catechism of natural re-
ligion in hand, one could, with limited caution, describe more concretely the 
projected «harmony» as more like divine-human cooperation, or as something 
akin to human friendship, albeit with the supreme being 13.
 Will there ever be a state of affairs in which justice prevails, of what has 
traditionally been called a «future state of rewards and punishments»? Can 
one answer the question on the basis of reason alone? Finnis does not consid-
er the matter, and I think that there is no practically certain answer. Reason 
certainly cannot tell us what either future state might be like. Coming to know 
whether there is such a thing as a final judgment at or after death, and whether 
there are post-mortem states of being such as «heaven» and «hell», depends 
upon the contingent possibility that God might communicate such informa-
tion to humankind, through what most people (Finnis included) call revelation.
ii. the basiC gooD oF Religion
NLNR is justly studied for its explanation of what Finnis says, «since 
Cicero, we summarily and lamely call» religion 14. In chapter four Finnis de-
scribes it as one of the several «basic values» (what more often he calls in 
13 NLNR, op. cit., p. 387. At pp. 405-06, Finnis discussed the «claim to know what God wills», and 
opined that it would «go[] beyond what can be affirmed about D on the basis of philosophical 
argumentation». Any such claim would rely upon some definite revelation that communicated, 
inter alia, the truths «that friendship with God, some sharing in God’s life and knowledge and 
love-of-goods, is available to those who positively favor what God positively favors».
14 NLNR, op. cit., p. 89.
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other writings, basic human goods 15). Religion consists in the «establishment 
and maintenance of proper relationships between oneself ...and the divine» 16. 
This irreducibly distinct human activity can be understood and affirmed as 
valuable without any prior or accompanying commitment to belief in God (or 
gods). As Finnis writes: «if there is a transcendent origin of the universal order 
of things and of human freedom and reason, then one’s life and actions are in 
fundamental disorder if they are not brought, as best one can, into some sort 
of harmony with whatever can be known or surmised about that transcendent 
other and its lasting order» 17. Finnis further asks whether it is «reasonable to 
deny that it is, at any rate, peculiarly important to have thought reasonably 
and (where possible) correctly about these questions of the origins of cosmic 
order and of human freedom and reason» – even if those answers are agnostic 
or negative? 18
The meaning and appeal of religion as a basic human good swing free 
of any propositions constitutive of natural theology. So, too, provisionally 
and up to a point, does the meaning and appeal of religious liberty. Provision-
ally, we can say that there is significant «religious» value in striving to learn 
the truth about the alpha and the omega of human existence, and in living 
according to what one’s discovers the truth to be. Even the agnostic and the 
atheist live in a certain harmony with the «divine» (for them, quite literally 
in scare-quotes). For they can understand and value the urgent quest to seek 
an understanding of what lies beyond time and the visible world, if anything 
does – and incorporating that knowledge (or doubt, I suppose), into their 
worldview, and lives.
But only up to a point, in this sense: religion can be affirmed as a basic 
good which can be participated in by all without presupposing any natural 
truth about the divine. But neither the affirmation nor the participation is 
15 In NLNR, and in many other places in his published works, Finnis acknowledged his debt to 
the pioneering work in the foundations of moral theory to Germain Grisez, and how his own 
work in the foundations of ethics was enriched by collaborating with Grisez and Grisez’ former 
graduate student, the philosopher Joseph Boyle. These three great scholars worked together 
on numerous occasions, perhaps most famously and fruitfully, in producing Nuclear Deterrence, 
Morality and Realism (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987). Their synoptic statement of the moral 
theory is «Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends», American Journal of Jurispru-
dence, vol. 32, 1987, p. 99.
16 NLNR, op. cit., p. 89.
17 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
18 Ibid., p. 89.
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possible without having first in mind the content of natural religion as live 
hypo theses. One must have some concept of what cosmic origins, purpose, di-
rection, and «D» mean, and suppose that there could be intelligible answers to 
religion questions, to get the religious quest aloft. The quest is made intelligi-
ble by the concepts which constitute (as it were) the object of the search.
iii. Religion(s) anD tRuth
If a reader were afforded just one word with which to describe the central 
theme of NLNR, it would be truth. Finnis maintains that one cannot ade-
quately do jurisprudence (legal theory) without a critically justified account 
of true human well-being. The wider arc of subject matters in the book come 
under the same judgment: political theory, social sciences generally, and any 
understanding of the political common good, are all adrift unless they are 
anchored in the truth about human flourishing 19. It is truth all the way down 
in NLNR, both as a description of Finnis’ own exemplary commitment to re-
lentlessly pursuing it, and of his distinctive methodology in jurisprudence and 
in social science generally.
Although nowhere in NLNR does Finnis quite express it in a declarative 
sentence, the upshot of what he says about the subject is that religions are, in 
essential and significant part, the kind of things that can be true or false. Re-
ligion is about (among other things) reality, visible as well as invisible, about 
what there was, is, and shall be. The various religions are in significant part 
different accounts of that reality. It is an unvarying, non-contingent truth that 
religion is an objective human good. But religions are more or less true ac-
counts of the cosmos 20. Putting these few thoughts together, it would seem 
also that whether one establishes «harmony» with a true(r) or (mostly) false 
religion makes a big difference to how one’s life goes.
19 Chapter I of NLNR is a compact but nonetheless compelling case for these theses.
20 Here it is perhaps helpful to retrieve one of Pope Benedict’s searing comments to Latin Amer-
ican bishops assembled in Aparecida, Brazil, in 2007. He told his listeners, many of whom were 
still in thrall to liberation theology, that all such political ideologies «falsify the notion of reality 
by detaching it from the foundational and decisive reality which is God». He explained that 
«only those who recognize God know reality», and that one «who excludes God from his hori-
zons falsifies the notion of ‘reality’ and, in consequence, can only end up in blind alleys or with 
recipes for destruction».
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iV. moRal Duty anD (to) Religious tRuth
There is a moral duty to seek religious truth. This is not to deny that there 
is in humankind a deep instinct or psychological urge to seek to know what is 
really the case. There probably are. It is to emphasize that once any person, 
even a little child, comes to experience the move from ignorance to knowledge 
as something available to (proto)choice, then the clear-headed person – one 
whose concern for truth is not blunted or stultified by non-rational motives 
(such as fear or sloth) – is impelled to seek the truth.
Is there not also a moral duty to seek the truth about Shakespeare’s al-
leged Catholicism, about who started the Peloponnesian War, and who won 
the 1919 World Series? Yes and no: knowledge of these matters is better than 
ignorance of them. In these three (and countless other) instances, it is easy 
to see the point of pursuing the relevant knowledge. And some people might 
indeed be obligated, by vocation or other special circumstances, to seek the 
truth in these or other contingent matters. But for most people, indifference 
to the Bard, Thucydides, or the notoriously corrupt «Black Sox» scandal of 
the 19 Series, gives rise to no moral concern.
Is it different with religion? Is there a special urgency to pursuing the 
truth about divine matters? Finnis and his collaborators have argued convinc-
ingly in several publications that the incommensurability of the basic human 
values, including life, knowledge, play, religion, friendship, marriage, aesthet-
ic performances, means that there is no common metric according to which 
one could say that friendship, for example, is simply better or more important 
than, say, religion. Or vice versa. In addition, they have argued persuasively 
that morality requires that all of the basic human goods be respected in all of 
our choices, such that it is wrong to intentionally damage or destroy any of 
them in anyone’s life. But this equal application of a «do-no-harm» norm has 
no tendency to elevate the pursuit of religion over enjoyment of other basic 
values. So, again: is there a special urgency or priority to the moral duty to 
seek religious truth?
There is. Religion pertains to truths about the origins of all that there is, 
the encompassing purposes of human existence, and potentially about path-
ways to a mode of being that transcends space and time – an «afterlife». Given 
what religion is about, then, anyone can see that religious knowledge is espe-
cially valuable. Religious ignorance is especially debilitating. Ignorance about 
the transcendent is bad. Indifference to the religious question is morally de-
fective. When one adds to these considerations the possibility of revelation 
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whereby one could gain access to an otherwise unimaginable way of living 
here and now, and then possibly after death forever, the moral duty to seek 
religious truth acquires a special, if not unique, urgency.
V. selF-Constitution thRough FRee ChoiCe
In the Postscript Finnis wrote that, «[t]he fact that we can make free 
choices, for which we are responsible, and which have self-determining 
(self-constituting) significance, is clearly affirmed, and if one reads all the pag-
es indicated in the index under ‘Freedom’ and ‘Self-constitution’, and the note 
on p. 127, one will have a fair idea of the fact’s significance» 21. But, Finnis add-
ed in 2011, «no clear definition is articulated, though the needed definition 
is presupposed on, and indeed inferable from» the relevant passage on page 
384 22. Finnis then reiterated a definition of free choice he first offered in his 
1983 book, Fundamentals of Ethics: «a choice is free if and only if it is between 
open practical alternatives (i.e. to do this, or to do that...) such that there is 
no factor but the choosing itself which settles which alternative is chosen» 23.
The incommensurability of the basic values is the matrix of this reali-
ty of morally significant free choice. «By disclosing a horizon of attractive 
possibilities for us, our grasp of the basic values this creates, not answers, the 
problem for intelligent decision: What is to be done? We have, in the abstract, 
no reason to leave any of the basic goods out of account» 24. But we cannot 
choose everything on offer. We must decide between incompatible alterna-
tive proposals for action. To have this (these) choice(s) between proposals for 
action «is the primary respect in which we can call ourselves both free and re-
sponsible» 25. Several times in NLNR Finnis provides arguments for affirming 
that such free choices can be, and commonly are, made.
What does this reality have to do with religion, and with religious liber-
ty? After all, the religious quest for truth about divine matters would seem to 
be, basically, a matter of adducing, sorting, and critically judging the available 
evidence – an intellectual operation, not really performable by an artificial 
21 NLNR, op. cit., 2nd edition, p. 420.
22 Ibid., p. 420.
23 Ibidem.
24 NLNR, op. cit., p. 100.
25 Ibid., p. 100.
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intelligence, but, well, maybe almost. No matter: there are innumerable free 
choices throughout the religious quest. Petty distractions and various sub-ra-
tional motives (perhaps chiefly, a fear of how one’s life might be upended by 
finding religious truth), may threaten anyone’s dedication to unbiased critical 
inquiry into what there is. Some people might scarcely register these choices 
consciously as choices; they are sufficiently habituated to honest inquiry that it 
comes naturally, spontaneously. Others will have to lean into the task, and may 
often consciously set themselves to doing it, without derailment by appealing 
frolics and detours.
There is always, moreover, a free choice at the end of investigating, 
weighing, and identifying the truth about any given subject. The intellect may 
identify the truth by operations (reading, logic) that do not involve moral 
evaluation and choice. But, then, the question: shall I affirm as true what my 
deliberations have convinced me is true? When the subject matter is arithme-
tic or chemistry, the willingness to affirm is so effortless that it seems not to 
occur at all; it is standing, habitual. Besides, it is hard to imagine what would 
tempt anyone to deny what the evidence and logic so clearly require one to 
affirm. When the subject matter is history or politics, though, one is more 
likely to become aware of consciously affirming that, say, a certain national 
group (mine) really was guilty of war crimes. In these sorts of cases and in 
the case of religious belief as well, there is almost always going to be some ev-
idence against what clear-headed analysis shows to be true, and this evidence 
combined with temptations supplied by sub-rational motives, is liable to make 
suspension of belief, or the affirmation of what is false, an intelligible option 
for choice. In these cases, then, the free choice to be guided undistractedly by 
the truth wherever it leads, becomes morally significant and constitutive of 
one’s character.
When the subject matter is religion, affirming as true a particular set of 
propositions (a putative revelation set out in a sacred book) entails a signif-
icant life commitment. In that case, one will surely entertain the question: 
even though this really does seem to be true, do I want to affirm it? Or, could 
(should?) I just let the matter drop, and concern myself with other things? 26 
26 In NLNR Finnis asserted that the «dignity of even the mistaken conscience... flows from the 
fact that practical reasonableness is not simply a mechanism for producing correct judgments, 
but an aspect of personal full-being, to be respected (like all other aspects) in every act as well as 
‘over-all’ – whatever the consequences» (NLNR, op. cit., p. 126).
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This decision invariably engages free choice. Often, making the right choice 
involves heroic witness to the value of truth.
Finnis extended his 1980 discussion of free choice by noting in the 
«Postscript» that the «notion of freedom of choice, as the matrix in which 
human responsibility for good is set, first becomes an explicit theme in Chris-
tian writings. It is given great prominence by Thomas Aquinas», who opened 
the relevant part of his Summa by stating that «human beings are made in the 
image of God, and this implies... that they are intelligent and free in judgment 
and self-mastery». Each person «is the source of his or her own actions and 
has freedom of judgment and power over his or her works and deeds» 27. It is 
important to note, too, especially in contemporary cultures given, that the 
«self-determining» quality of free choices is largely reflexive; that is, the effect 
of choosing the good (or bad), upon one’s own character. The point is not to 
choose for the sake of choosing, and in choosing somehow to establish one’s 
unique «identity». It is rather to align oneself with, and thus witness to, the 
truth.
Vi. «ConneCting the Dots»
Based upon these several cornerstones elaborated in NLNR, we can bring 
into sharp relief a robust conception of religious liberty. Building upon the 
truths of natural religion, the basic good of religion (and the account of practi-
cal reason and its first principles of which it is a part), the reality of free-choice 
and how, in morally significant situations, it is self-determining, we can easily 
see that religious liberty is a human right. We can see that protecting it is a 
way to promote the good of religion. And we can see that protecting religious 
liberty (thus, promoting religion), is part of the common good of any political 
community. For that «common good» is (as Finnis has often pointed out in 
his writings) your good, and mine, and his and hers, and so on. In other words, 
the «common good» is fundamentally the good of all the persons whose polit-
ical community it is. There is a wide range of morally defensible ways of doing 
so, and the best way of doing so in any particular community at a given mo-
ment will depend upon a mix of principle and contingencies of history. With 
that caveat, we can say based upon NLNR that protecting religious liberty is 
27 NLNR, op. cit., p. 127.
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among the highest duties of public authorities, and that promoting religion 
itself is, too.
Now, the significant doctrinal development in Dignitatis humanae has to do 
with the public celebration of non-Catholic religious rituals and rites. DH af-
firms the «right» of individuals and religious communities «not to be prevent-
ed from publicly teaching and bearing witness to their beliefs by the spoken or 
written word». Persons and their communities have concomitant» right(s)» to 
manifest their beliefs in «public worship», «in erecting buildings for religious 
purposes», and to «hold meetings or establish educational, cultural charitable 
or social organizations». All these «rights» pertain to non-Catholic religions, 
as well as to Catholicism.
The center of gravity of the whole document is, however, self-constitu-
tion through free inquiry and choice about matters religious. It is quite true 
that it is perennial Catholic teaching that the act of religious faith must be 
free. But this great truth was given a distinctive new emphasis by the Council; 
there is an invigorated sense that each person must be the author of his or her 
own religious convictions, and acts.
The Council’s synoptic description of that foundation stone could serve 
as a summation of what Finnis indicated about religious liberty in NLNR:
It is in accordance with their dignity as persons-that is, beings en-
dowed with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal 
responsibility-that all men should be at once impelled by nature and also 
bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. 
They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order 
their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth. However, men cannot 
discharge these obligations in a manner in keeping with their own nature 
unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion as well as psychological 
freedom. Therefore, the right to religious freedom has its foundation not 
in the subjective disposition of the person, but in his very nature. In conse-
quence, the right to this immunity continues to exist even in those who do 
not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it and the 
exercise of this right is not to be impeded, provided that just public order 
be observed 28.
28 Second Vatican Council. Declaration on Religious Liberty Dignitatis humanae, 2, Vatican City, 
1965.
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Vii. ReVelation
Finnis’ limited attention to natural religion in NLNR, along with his sub-
stantial development of the basic good of religion, shows the reasonableness 
of actually holding religious beliefs, over against skeptical (and other) sorts 
of objections to doing so. The truths of natural religion in particular provide 
reasons to expect some intelligible communication from God to humankind – 
«revelation». Finnis said in 1980: «Inasmuch as the speculation suggests that 
D acts and knows. It suggests that D’s existing is conceivable on the model of 
personal life. It therefore suggests that some sort of communication from or 
self-disclosure of D might occur» 29. The affirmation of these «speculative» 
characteristics of God in 2011 makes the likelihood of some revelation that 
much more likely. But «[w]hether this does occur», Finnis rightly says, «is a 
question of fact, experience, history» 30.
Finnis emphasizes the distinction between the Platonic/Aristotelian 
claims of interior access to the divine through meditation and contempla-
tion, and revelation in the biblical tradition. «Plato has no conception corre-
sponding to Aquinas’s differentiated concept of divine law, i.e. the law which 
supplements the natural law and is promulgated by God for the regulation of 
the community or communities (Israel and then the universal Church) consti-
tuted through God’s Public self-revelation and offer of friendship. For Plato, 
while he would affirm that God can be apprehended by us in the act and ex-
perience of human understand, has no conception of a revelation accessible to 
men without the effort of rational dialectic and contemplation – of the sort 
of empirical revelation, for instance, that would be ‘folly to the Greeks’ (but 
would be offered to them none the less)». 31
This possibility of revelation considered by itself is indescribably good 
news for humankind. For revelation portends access to truths pertinent to the 
meaning, purpose, conduct, and extension of human existence, which truths 
are otherwise inaccessible to reason. Revelation promises to enrich the pros-
pects for any human person seeking to come into a proper relationship with 
God. If revelation includes directions about how persons are to relate to God, 
then men and women could establish harmony with the divine entity in ways 
otherwise unimaginable.
29 NLNR, op. cit., p. 392
30 Ibidem.
31 Ibid., p. 396.
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The human experience with putative revelations is, however, cause for 
ambivalence. Information asserted to be revelatory is very often false. Some-
times those who claim to have received divine communications are simply 
frauds. Other times reporters in good faith either misunderstand some sort of 
spiritual experience, or fail to comprehend what seems to them to be a more 
propositional message from God. Sometimes those who report revelations 
lack the critical capacity to grasp and to articulate what has come from God 
in terms unspoiled by ambient cultural and historical prejudices. And, if there 
really is an entity which Christians (among others) call Satan, then there is the 
possibility that some genuine communication coming from the transcendent 
spirit-world is purposely leading people away from God.
Pseudo-revelations could, and as a matter of historical fact have, included 
instructions which diminish the divine-human relationship, and which inter-
fere with enjoyment of the basic good of religion. Not only might a message 
considered revelatory require faithful recipients to abjure any sense of friend-
ship with God, in favor of abject, servile submission to God’s expressed will. 
A putative revelation might also instruct believers to treat those who sub-
scribe to different religions, or who belong to other ethnic, racial, or national 
groups, with contempt. In any event, putative communications from God to 
human beings are a key determinant of how adherents of different religions 
understand religious liberty, notwithstanding what reason reveals and affirms 
about religion and freedom. Simply put, putative revelations can and often 
have undermined religious liberty.
Finnis’ revised account of natural theology not only provides reasonable 
grounds to expect revelation. It also supplies critical criteria by which to judge 
the veracity of putative revelations. For if the propositions affirmed on the 
basis of reason are true, then any alleged revelation which contradicts those 
true propositions, is false – at least, so long as one does not subscribe to any 
diremption in the world of truths, such that what reason shows to be false, 
religion shows to be true, and vice versa. Polytheism is false because it contra-
dicts monotheism, which is true. Sincere reports from seers, mystics, proph-
ets, shamans, and ordinary folks that the «gods» have spoken to them, must be 
discarded as unreliable, if they are false; that is, if they contradict what reason 
shows to be true.
Believers have often engineered a «two-truth» reconciliation of the 
propositional content of religions with the nearly unassailable data of the nat-
ural sciences, history, and even textual criticism. This irenicism holds that 
both «A» and «not A» are true, one vindicated by reason and the other by 
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alleged divine communication. Other believers have simply closed their eyes 
and dogmatically denied some unassailable facts.
Many Christians have over the last century or so devised another way 
to hold onto Scripture and tradition by reimagining Scripture, no longer as 
inspired by the Holy Spirit and thus without error in the sacred author’s asser-
tions, but rather as a collection of fables, symbols, and other edifying expres-
sions of some elusive limit experience of the sacred writer or of his particular 
second-century faith community, or both. Christian creeds and doctrines have 
been assimilated, in other words, to a more existential mode of understanding 
religion. Jaroslav Pelikan described this «affectional transposition» of Chris-
tian doctrine in his masterful History of the Development of Christian Doctrine. 
Pelikan showed how texts which had for centuries been understood to refer to 
realities (visible and invisible) as well as to moral perfection, were reimagined 
by a «theology of the heart». For instance: «Miracle, mystery, and authority, 
whose validity as objective realities seemed to have reached a dead end, took 
on new life when they became, instead, ways of speaking about the subjective 
validity of inward experience» 32. In both settings, the apparent propositional 
content of religion is protected from the possibility of falsification by depriv-
ing it of any real-world referents. It is all a matter of the heart.
None of these reconciliation strategies is appealing. They all imply either 
that religion is not the sort of thing that is either true or false, or that retaining 
religious belief requires a diremption between reason and religion, or both 33.
32 yaRoslaV, P., The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine Vol. 5: Christian 
Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700), University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 119.
33 Catholic doctrine on religious liberty avoids these implications. In Dignitatis humanae, op. cit., 
10, the Council Fathers asserted that «one of the major tenets of Catholic doctrine [is] that 
man’s response to God in faith must be free: no one therefore is to be forced to embrace the 
Christian faith against his own will». They wrote:
 The declaration of this Vatican Council on the right of man to religious freedom has its 
foundation in the dignity of the person, whose exigencies have come to be are fully known to 
human reason through centuries of experience. What is more, this doctrine of freedom has 
roots in divine revelation, and for this reason Christians are bound to respect it all the more 
conscientiously. Revelation does not indeed affirm in so many words the right of man to im-
munity from external coercion in matters religious. It does, however, disclose the dignity of 
the human person in its full dimensions. It gives evidence of the respect which Christ showed 
toward the freedom with which man is to fulfill his duty of belief in the word of God and it 
gives us lessons in the spirit which disciples of such a Master ought to adopt and continually 
follow. Thus, further light is cast upon the general principles upon which the doctrine of this 
declaration on religious freedom is based. In particular, religious freedom in society is entirely 
consonant with the freedom of the act of Christian faith (vid., Dignitatis humanae, op. cit., 9).
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Viii. CultuRal RePeRCussions
The basic concept of religious liberty is unintelligible so long as one hy-
pothesizes – as some pieces of the preceding sections might suggest one well 
could – the solitary human individual engaged in an existential/intellectual 
quest. But, apart from the possibility of an intelligible private revelation to 
a Robinson Crusoe, no possibly fruitful religious quest is imaginable save in 
company of others. For anyone’s intelligent quest depends upon a certain level 
of education and mental discipline. That takes others who teach. Thinking 
through the questions of cosmic meaning and purpose as they present them-
selves to homo religious requires also developed categories of thought, supple 
language, and critical reasoning skills which are not found in nature or in the 
untutored human psyche. That takes (for lack perhaps of a technical term) a 
tradition. In fact, any intelligent religious quest depends upon a capacity for 
abstraction and conceptual understanding that far exceeds anything one could 
possibly achieve in isolation.
Anyone’s intelligent quest depends upon culture, and upon community. 
Besides the fact that only communities produce culture, ongoing conversation 
and comparison with others’ thinking is as important to carrying on the search 
for answers to religious questions as they are to any other search for knowl-
edge. It is also quite likely (at least, history suggest that it is) that putative as 
well as genuine revelatory communications will be directed to one or a few, 
who are then charged with transmitting the news to rest of the group, if not 
to everyone.
Besides, religious liberty is really comprised of two moral duties. One is 
each person’s obligation to seek, to affirm as one responsibly can, and to live 
in accord with what one affirms. The basic right of religious liberty is ground-
ed upon this duty; being free from the undue influence of others is meant to 
provide the space needed to be the author of one’s own religious convictions, 
to own them. Religious liberty consists of one more duty: the moral obligation 
of everyone, including public authorities, to respect each one’s honest, self-de-
termining religious quest and, within limits, religious acts, by not coercing or 
pressuring or cajoling the seeker. Government in a just society will do all that 
it reasonable can do to protect everyone’s enjoyment of this right.
Much more could be said about what any society needs to do to make the 
religious quest a lively possibility for its members. Perhaps most basic is this: 
governments stand in an asymmetrical relationship to religious liberty and the 
moral obligations in which it consists. Public authorities have the wherewithal 
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to gravely impair the religious well-being of the people. Many governments 
have done so. Governments have very limited means at their disposal, though, 
to stimulate and promote a robust religious liberty. Public authority serves 
religion and religious liberty best largely, but still far from entirely, leaving 
the religious life of the people to civil society; that is, to the culture – and then 
supporting that culture.
Finnis does not pursue in NLNR this question of the distinctive cultural 
milieu which religious liberty calls for 34. It would seem nonetheless that, based 
upon what he does say, a culture that is able to achieve genuine religious liber-
ty must be characterized by a commitment to at least three propositions. First, 
that religion is a zone of truth, not an enclave of tradition, custom, identity, 
projections, emotions, and edifying fables. Second, that there is an important, 
inalienable personal moral duty to seek out and to embrace religious truth. 
Third, that religious liberty has to be securely distinguished from other sorts 
of liberty, even from the right of conscience with which it partly overlaps. 
Without these three cultural anchors – and no matter how much freedom 
from external interference characterizes a society – there will not be religious 
liberty.
First: by «zone of truth» I do not mean that specifically Catholic faith, 
for example, includes assent to true propositions (as we find in the Creed, 
34 Authoritative Catholic writers have zeroed in on this question over the last generation, with 
great insight. For one thing, culture is fundamentally the religious question writ large. Pope 
John Paul II wrote in his encyclical letter Centesimus annus [24]: «At the heart of every culture 
lies the attitude man takes to the greatest mystery: the mystery of God. Different cultures are 
basically different ways of facing the question of the meaning of personal existence». As that 
Pope once said to Francis Cardinal George: «Faith creates culture». Pope Benedict XVI told 
visiting American bishops in 2012: «At the heart of every culture, whether perceived or not, is 
a consensus about the nature of reality». To representatives of French culture Pope Benedict 
said in 2008: «What gave Europe’s culture its foundation – the search for God the readiness 
to listen to him – remains today the basis of any genuine culture». In other words: culture 
is or at least should be organized around the quest for truth about divine reality. In his 2011 
World Day of peace Message («Religious Freedom, the Path to Peace») Pope Benedict Pope 
Benedict spoke more pointedly about culture and religious freedom than at any other time. 
He spoke of «the religious dimension of culture, built up over the centuries thanks to the so-
cial and especially ethical contributions of religion». «More important still is religion’s ethical 
contribution in the political sphere». And he stated: «Religious freedom is... an achievement 
of a sound political and juridical culture». In other words (and here adapting the Pontiff’s 
thought): religious liberty is a cultural achievement. It is not something which is the fruit of the 
earth or which is so obviously conducive to human happiness that no society could fail to 
promote it. Religious liberty is a cultural achievement which history and current events show 
to be uncommon, and fragile.
GERARD BRADLEY
608 PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 83 / 2020/2
in the Decalogue, elsewhere in Scripture where the sacred authors assert a 
proposition). Religious liberty does not depend upon this «zone of truth». It 
depends instead upon an essential precondition, or implication of this «zone»: 
that religion is the kind of thing that is either true or false. «True or false» 
here means objectively the case, or not. It is not the watered-down subjective 
sense of «true», such that my religion is «true» for me because it corresponds 
to my experiences and feelings and expresses them more or less adequately, 
and your religion is «true» for you, for the same reasons. It is not the more 
anticipatory truth of self-assertion, or what is often denoted by the term «per-
sonal identity», such that one projects an idealized image of oneself, and there-
after strives to somehow become that ideal.
Second: Dignitatis humanae asserted that «[a]ll men are impelled by na-
ture and also by moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. 
They are also bound to adhere to the truth once it is known, and to order 
their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth». Just so. But getting 
people to take this moral duty seriously is a difficult task in modern culture, 
which is secularized and treats religion as a private pursuit for persons whose 
tastes incline them in that (odd) direction. Compliance with this duty is not 
in any event straightforwardly a true norm of justice, as if we owe it to other 
people to seek the truth and wrong them if we do not (I say not «straightfor-
wardly» because I think that there is a moral obligation to promote others’ 
compliance with their moral duties, including their duty to seek religious 
truth, by setting a good example and even by remonstrating with them. An 
individual who shirks his own duty to seek religious truth sets a bad exam-
ple, and is unlikely to encourage others by words to do what that individual 
has declined himself or herself to do). Compliance is also not quite a duty 
to God; at least, it is hard to compellingly make that case insofar as «God» 
is a hypothesis and not yet a reality (much less a personal reality to which 
humankind might owe moral duties), ex ante in the religious pursuit of truth. 
Compliance might be rightly considered a moral duty to oneself. If so, ig-
noring it would be what we call now a «victimless immorality», which most 
today see as not immoral at all.
In the end, there is no basis for legally punishing anyone for failing to 
conscientiously investigate divine matters. And trying to force anyone by less 
drastic means to perform this moral duty is self-defeating. One cannot make 
another honestly believe in the truth of any proposition. Trying to do can only 
result (at most) in feigned or half-hearted assent.
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The third cultural requirement for religious liberty – that it must be 
distinguished from other sorts of liberties – is perhaps just an implication of 
the first two. To detach religious liberty from truth is to decapitate it. This is 
the danger in today’s post-Christian societies, and the peril is often abetted 
by treating «religious liberty» as a synonym for «rights of conscience».
Respecting «conscience» is indeed a good thing. But it has nothing 
necessarily to do with religion; respecting and making room (within limits) 
for all to deliberate, choose, and act according to internal guidance and thus 
to function as morally integrated persons, is a great good. Religious liberty 
includes all this, and more: The believer acts not only with reference to in-
ternal cohesion. He or she also acts in relationship to God. «Conscience» 
rights pertain to the inner harmony of any acting person. «Religious liber-
ty» refers to that as well as to harmony between the acting person and the 
transcendent God. Besides, the social and political role of genuine religious 
conviction goes beyond the importance of respect for conscience alone 35.
Returning to the matter of asymmetry and government care for re-
ligious liberty, it is no doubt the case that paramount obligation is to es-
chew the coercion and oppression that all-too-often have characterized their 
attitude to some, many, or even all believers in their societies. But saying 
that avoiding persecution is the most urgent imperative does not mean that 
public authorities do not have other necessary, crucial responsibilities. We 
can now see and say that governments have a grave obligation to work stra-
tegically to help create and sustain the cultural conditions which religious 
liberty entail.
35 In his 2010 Christmas greeting to the Roman Curia, Pope Benedict also noted that «In modern 
thinking, the word ‘conscience’ signifies that for moral and religious questions, it is the subjec-
tive dimension, the individual that constitutes the final authority for decision». He observed 
further that the modern world is «divided into the realms of the objective and the subjective». 
Religion and morals, the Pope continued, «lie within the subjective realm. Here, it is said, 
there are in the final analysis no objective criteria». Each person must be guided by and indeed 
governed by his «intuitions and experiences», not objective truth. Pope Benedict argued that 
a truer understanding of conscience is as «both capacity for truth and obedience to the truth 
which manifests itself to anyone who seeks it with an open heart». The path of «conversion is 
a path of conscience – not a path of self-asserting subjectivity but, on the contrary, a path of 
obedience to truth». This «conscience» is not and cannot be turned in upon itself, as if the point 
of any «right» of conscience was to make way for persons to express their most authentic selves. 
Conscience and respect for it – both rightly understood – are subsumed within genuine religious 
freedom.
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